Interceptor

[Erfolg]

This book was recommended initially by Colin Leighfield, primarily for the Meteor content. Normally I find books about UK aircraft rather lacking. In fact i would go as far to say as eulogies to national treasures, rather than being particularly factual.

This book is not of that ilk, describing the history in a structured and above all it is credible.

It really a must have book, available second hand for about £5 + p&p on Amazon. My copy was £0.01 +p&p.

Interceptor -- RAF Single Seat Multi Gunfighters. Author James Goulding, Published Ian Allen.

So what does it tell you that other books omit?

Firstly aircraft specifications and then design is considered from the perspective of the need to carry weapons, mainly guns/cannons, whilst typically being constrained by available engines. Against a performance requirement.

As part of this story, the selected aircraft are described in a process, where initially drawings/sketches are made, refined, re-evaluated, until the aircraft we think we know emerges. The Spitfire process is interesting, particularly that the elliptical wing evolved, rather than being the starting point.

Although light on the politics and how specification and contracts are awarded, the book again does acknowledge that a balancing act between what the services think they want, what aircraft companies believe can be done and the MOD converts into a specification and contract document.

In passing some comment is made with respect to the Miles M52. In that it could have been cancelled, due to concerns that the engine being developed for the aircraft was not up to delivering the power necessary. Not that the airframe was not capable of breaking the sound barrier.

Given the historic problems with power jet engines, the author is probably correct. The area of early jet engines is not entered into, other than mentioning whose engines were used and inherent delays experienced etc.

Then there is the insight that the Hurricane was conceived as a low risk, work horse, that could be built to acceptable costs, using well proven techniques. Very much the same idea as the Fw 190.

There is a lot in the book, a lot of necessity is omitted, the subject itself is worthy of several volumes, yet there is much more content than most books on British aircraft ever provide. Perhaps the biggest complement that can be made, is that if the book had been longer, the threads that link aircraft evolvement would be lost and the pertinent points would have been lost in the detail. The author has managed to provide a much clearer understanding of what did and actually does happen in the development of aircraft than most books provide.

All this aside, the book is a good read, and informative.

[Colin Leighfield]

I'm glad you enjoyed it Erfolg, it really has a wealth of useful information for fighter enthusiasts and particularly us modellers, there are designs in there that most of us never knew existed.

The observations about the M52 are enhanced by the book recently written by Eric Brown which included a lot of information only recently discovered. The augmented thrust turbojet developed by Whittle intended for the second prototype, which was intended to be the supersonic one, was completed and running at 6,500 lbs. thrust. Most recent calculations show that the M52 would have equalled the Bell X1's performance and achieved 1,000 mph. The limit wasn't the engine, because above Mach1 the aircraft would have continued to accelerate to the point where the pilot would have had to throttle back for airframe limitations, the engine power increased with speed, like a ram-jet. Whereas the X1 could only do this for a very few minutes and depended on an air launch, the M52 could have taken off normally, flown for 40 minutes, climbed at a very high rate to 40,000 ft. and sustained supersonic flight for 10 minutes, then landed normally, ready to go again.

The choice of a straight wing was deliberate, the option of swept or delta wings was discussed in 1943. Although it was agreed than that a swept wing would ease penetration of the sound barrier, at higher speeds around Mach 1.5 the straight wing with a bi-convex section was considered to have superior characteristics to swept. Brown points to this conclusion having being drawn by Lockheed with the F104. I know that recently there was debate in this forum about swept wings and BEB supported the view that the leading edge angle was the key issue in sweep, but Brown definitely describes the Starfighter as being straight wing. Also, the M52 wing was designed and shaped so that It was always inside the Mach1 plus shock wave created by the nose cone. Another feature was that because the fuselage diameter was minimised in relation to the engine diameter, wing attachment was by annular frames, which made it easy to fit different wings, swept wings could easily have been fitted at a later date.

A Conservative government select committee investigation into the state of British experiences in high speed flight in 1955 concluded that cancellation of the M52 had been a catastrophic mistake and had put us back years. In the end the decision to pay a team under Barnes Wallis at Vickers to test a series of large scale models based on the M52 cost more than it would have done to complete the project and only managed to successfully launch one rocket powered model from a Mosquito after a series of failures. This accelerated up to 935 mph in level flight before the cut-off mechanism failed and it flew on until lost in the Atlantic. What a farce.

Finally the baleful negative influence of Barnes Wallis on this project becomes clear, also surprisingly the indications that there was some connivance with the Americans, who were desperate to be the first to fly supersonically and time the flight to co-incide with the launch of the USAF as it replaced the USAAF. It is exactly what happened with the X1. This success was only possible after the original loss of high speed control problems with the X1 by the adoption of an all-flying tail, which was a feature of the M52 from the beginning and had been tested on the Miles Gillette Falcon and a Spitfire. The government instructed that all M52 data be handed over to the U.S, which it was. Anyone can see that the resemblance of the X1 to the M52 is more than a co-incidence and Brown has no doubt about it at all. Like most of us I think, his opinions carry great weight with me.

[Erfolg]

With hindsight it may be possible to come to the conclusion that the Whittle engine could have broken the sound barrier.

From the view point of the 1940s, it is apparent that the Whittle engines and the development programme of Power Jets was at best considered as unimpressive.

The fact that Rovers established their own manufacturing facilities and design was a consequence of Power Jets being a problem with their inflexibility and believe that theres was the only way. The very poor business acumen and financial controls what drove Churchill into finally buying/nationalisation of Power jets.

It is a pity that Rolls Royce or many of the other engine builders were not chosen as the engine partner, as I would suspect that their standing, in having delivered previous engines, where as Power Jets were a not in the same league.

Whittle may have been one of the forerunners in jet engines, yet just as Von Ohain, others picked up the baton and ran further, faster, with greater abilities.

The MOD knew that the M52 had supersonic capability as a model was tested with a rocket motor.

Another aspect that is seldom mentioned is that Barnes Wallis/Vickers worked against the M52, seeking more funding for his Swallow project.

Given that the UK was essentially bankrupt, something had to give, somewhere.

To be honest, even now I have doubts about Whittles insistence of the double sided compressor and the known massive losses and poor mass flow when compared to other units available even back then. In some respects the afterburners is how many prior to the Jet engine as we know saw jet propulsion being being achieved. I can understand why there would be doubts about the engine.

[Colin Leighfield]

You need to read the book Erfolg. The augmented W2B was running at rated thrust before the project was cancelled. The compressor design wasn't critical to achievement of the rated performance, it was more than capable of it. Later the design principles used by Whittle to augment thrust at high supersonic speeds were picked up by the Americans and are a key feature of the J85 engines in the Blackbird. When the project was cancelled most of the money had been spent and was surpassed in cost by the model project given to Barnes Wallis that resulted in one successful test launch. When you look at the money that got poured into the Brabazon, AW52, Swallow etc. it could clearly have been better spent.

[Tony Richardson]

Glad to see you had a safe journey home Colin and I hope you enjoyed your stay in my part of the world.

A few Christmas's ago I was given a stocking stuffer by my son in the form of a book titled "Empire of the clouds" it chronicles the British aircraft industry through the war years and into the years where it all fell prey to the Industrial might of the USA . One prominent character in this book is an ex RAF pilot (Canadian) and test pilot named Bill Waterton, his input and the old world thinking (if true) explains why the British aircraft industry fell behind the other major players in th industry, Canada also fell prey to the USA when the prime minister of the day was persuaded to abandon the Avro Arrow (CF 105) project in favour of a missile defence system which as we now know was a bit of a fizzer.

Very interesting read if you like that sort of thing.

Again welcome home Colin.

Tony.

[Colin Leighfield]

Tony, thank you. We got back home on Monday. Our stay in Canada was wonderful, with three days in Toronto, Banff, two days on the Rocky Mountaineer, with an overnight in Kamloops, three days in Vancouver and seven on the Celebrity Infinity to Alaska, landing in Icy Point Strait, Juneau and Ketchikan, as well as spending several hours at the Hubbard Glacier.

We love Canada, it was my first time back since 1998 and I'm sure we will go again.

I have "Empire of the Clouds" in my collection. It's a heartbreaking read in many ways. Bill Waterton's autobiography "The Quick and the Dead" was an eye-opener when I first read it and that must have been 40 or more years ago. His dismissal from Gloster after an outstanding career, because he refused to sign off the Javelin due to underlying handling defects was a disgrace. When you look at the restrictions placed on the Javelin throughout its' career because of these underlying problems, it makes you think that Waterton was right all along. The RAF would have been better off buying the CF100 Canuck from Avro Canada, in spite of its straight wing it had similar performance and was dived supersonically, which the Javelin was just capable of doing. He died quite recently, I believe. He was lucky to survive the test programme on the Javelin, in service one example demonstrated an inability to recover from a high speed stall which occurring at 37, 000 ft, which tends to confirm that he had a point in his criticisms. At least his conscience was clear.

The cancellation of the CF105 by the Diefenbaker government remains as an example of an almost certain bitter mistake with long term consequences and has many similarities to the experiences with M52 and TSR2, with deceitful politics and deliberate misrepresentation to mislead the public. It isn't only Great Britain where incompetents like Dennis Healey, with a record of getting things totally wrong, can later be considered as elder statesmen. It demonstrates my principle that someone who has a burning desire to be a politician shouldn't be allowed because that desire is a clear indication that they aren't suitable. A plague on their houses, politics is the ultimate failed profession in my book and it doesn't get any better, sadly.

[Tony Richardson]

Glad you enjoyed your trip Colin you certainly did a lot of traveling.

As for the politicians remember "absolute power corrupts absolutely" and we have a PM who is at the moment certainly on a power trip.

[Colin Leighfield]

I picked that up from the press and news, it's the same wherever you go. Keep your head down and go flying, at least it takes your mind off things!

[Erfolg]

Colin

I also have the M52 book by Eric Brown.

I am not surprised at the possible political aspects to the M52. It is apparent from a number of books written about the general relationships between industry, the MOD as well as political and other connections and my own observations and experiences, that contracts are won over a protracted period.

Gaining a seat on any overseeing committee, is highly valued, by any organisation, in addition to the individual. It provides the opportunity to access the general mood, to influence and advice your own business on the best approach with respect o other matters. It is little wonder that companies will provide individuals at their own expense, many would be happy to pay to people there. It is little wonder that Barnes Wallis was happy to be a supersonic committee member. Yet these arrangements are common, even today.

I have re read the EB book, and it is apparent from this source, which confirms another book I once had, that the project had heavily overspent from the original budget. Just as important, it is apparent that the Miles team, did not have anything close to definitive drawings of the engine even late into the project. They had been provided with envelope, temperature profiles ad some information of fuel consumption.

It is also apparent that the management of air flow into the engine was still something to be managed, beyond the concept of moving the nose section in and out.

What the book does not cover or explain why, was the appointment of Power Jets as the engine supplier. From some reading and television programmes, it is apparent that the MOD were not satisfied with PJ as a supplier. Which lead to Rover setting up their own company to develop and make a variant of the Whittle engine. Recognising that Rover were supposed to be partners and a supporting manufacturer to PJ, it more than hints at the difficult relationship. A particular issue was the double reversed flow compressor stage of the PJ engines and the impact on performance and reliability. I guess one day some of what actually transpired will be released by the MOD, from the parallel Rover set up to the Nationalisation of PJ, beyond some of the financial aspects published.

From the book and some reading it is not clear that the PJ engine was anywhere near a running device.

Reading the "Skystreak, Skyrocket and Stileto" by Scot Libis.It is interesting that the Skysteak managed to go supersonic on 5,000 lb of thrust. In some respects similar to the M52 with straight wings, although a conventional elevator assembly, with screwjack trimming tailplane. . The aircraft undertook most of its flights investigating the 0.8 to 0.99 mach, with a few supersonic flights in a dive. Perhaps also hints at a very real problem for the M52 was the flight duration, typically 30 minutes. This was due to how much room was available for fuel 230 gallons in a 10% wet wing, carrying 500 lb of instruments.

I know it is tempting to blame the USA for the failings of the UK industry. Yes, some aspects of their actions did not help, yet I would expect the USA to look after their own interests. The underlying problems, easily forgotten today are that the Uk was bankrupt, due to WW2. The markets that the UK assumed were their own, were now seeking independence, looking to their own futures. The transition from a wartime economy to a peace time economy, potentially could lead to mass unemployment, as contracts for military equipment were cancelled in may instances. The consumer market, did not have the income or access to lending to even stimulate a domestic market boom. From the the perspective of the aircraft industry, there were to many companies relative to demand. At the same time it was a time of great technological change, with respect to manufacturing techniques, materials, weaponry and so on. People such as Sidney Camm, Geoffrey Dehavilland and Barnes Wallis were expected to deliver contracts to their employers, if that was at the expense of other companies, well tough.

Even now, I am not sure that I would a a politician have backed the the M52, whilst I had many experts telling me, I can deliver more for less and with less risk. As an ex engineer, I can see an awful lot of money and risks ahead, even with todays knowledge of knowing relatively clearly the options that could work.

In many respects an air drop aircraft would have provide a greater reassurance of success, with more useful air time, with the potential of gathering a lot of sub sonic, transonic and some supersonic data.

[Colin Leighfield]

I think your anti-Whittle prejudice is showing through Erfolg. It's worth bearing in mind that Rover made such a mess of the jet project that the government intervened and engineered the exchange with Rolls Royce, jet contract for tank engine contract. That wasn't Whittle's fault.

This book was written because of the availability of new information. We now know that the Vickers tests showed that M52 drag was actually 20% lower than Miles' estimates, the performance estimates were if anything conservative. The second prototype was the one intended to go supersonic and it was going to have a variable intake nozzle.

I don't blame the Americans for the cancellation, they simply looked after their own best interests and Brown says that they were dumbfounded by the cancellation. The amount spent on the mostly abortive Vickers tests was double the re-calculated M52 budget including the overspend.

All the information available now says that the M52 would have achieved its' objectives and much earlier than anything else we tried to do for many years subsequently. As I mentioned before, a government enquiry in 1955 into the aviation industry concluded that cancellation of the M52 was a catastrophic mistake and put us back years. I will stick with that conclusion.

[Tony Richardson]

Don't get me wrong ERF I do not blame the USA for the decline of Britains aircraft industry that in part was due, as you say to the financial state of the country after the war and the "cottage industry" style of manufacture that was so important during the war to keep the production of aircraft from being stopped by a single bombing raid, the US on the other hand, partly because it is so large in land mass, partly because it had little to fear from air attack at the time had it's manufacturing plants mostly under one roof and was therefore able to step straight into the after war market for aircraft rather economically.

However I do somewhat blame the US government of the time for the demise of what would have been one of the great aircraft of the day the CF105, (which the USAF itself was lobbying their government to purchase I believe) but equal blame has to fall on the PM of the time "Diefenbaker" who was gullible enough to believe that the yet untested missile systems would suffice, then as now, big business rules our countries not government as they would have us believe.

This will be my last post on the subject as I have no wish to fall into a political argument with people on this forum whom I class as friends even though we may never have met.

Tony...

[Erfolg]

Colin

That is a bit strong with respect to Whittle.

The important aspect that Whittle played with respect to the Jet engine from the perspective of the Allies, is that he demonstrated that a Gas Turbine was viable.

From the perspective of the UK, a number of companies then picked up the same baton on ran harder. These incl. RR, MV, DeHavilland and of course Rover amongst many.

From what has been written there were development problems with the W2, which included surging. It appears Rover could not obtain agreement with PJ to incorporate changes they believed would solve the issues. Obtained permission to open their own facility and and produced the W2b. It is pretty obvious that the MOD had problems with Whittle and asked RR to take over the design and start both production of the PJ engine. These engines both became RR engines as the Derwent and Welland.

It must be recognised that Churchill was a Tory, who I am sure had no interest in Nationalising PJ, yet in the national interest this was done rather than Bankruptcy that beckoned with all the bills that had been run up.

Unfortunately, it seems Whittle was no businessman, he seemed to be a difficult character to deal with, to the extent that he managed to alienate the MOD and Rovers. Perhaps most unfortunately he apparently suffered from ill health, suffering a number of bouts of mental illness, which at the time would be treated less sympathetically than now.

I totally agree, that with hindsight that completing the project, potentially would have obtained more useful information than a number of other expensive projects.

Yet if you look at Miles, for the UK (may be a different story in the USA) the standing of Miles in the political corridors of Whitehall were not as extensive, as companies such as Vickers, Bristol. Neither did they have managers/designers/engineers with the standing of Barnes Wallis, Chadwick,Sidney Camm, Petter.

It should not be underestimated the position the UK was in post war. After the difficulties of the initial transition from a war time economy, the MOD, did initiate a good set of programmes that led to the Hunter, V-Bombers, Lightening, Canberra. Although the civil side became a disaster in most respects, I understand that the only successfully Brabazon project was the Britannia, and by stint of Vickers the Viscount.

I have nothing against Whittle, other than he was possibly politically the wrong man (as PJ) for the project. Any of the other engine builders, particularly RR, would have whispered in some ears, twisted the odd arm here and there. Yet above all RR would readily have the ear and been respected in many quarters where the PJ star was on the decline. I am sure they would have stood a greater chance of success that PJ in all respects.

As to achieving its objectives, hmm, may be, probably not. Everything depended on the aircraft being able to carry sufficient fuel and the engine provide enough thrust. That is to get high enough to get through the sound barrier. Although I would have expected a lot more data than just going through the sound barrier. If you take the X series or the US Navy programmes. The Douglas 558-1 undertook some 200 flights, which is not totally different to the other aircraft in these series. Again i think an air drop would have saved the fuel necessary for a good project.

I know you say you are not interested in the politics of the aircraft industry, yet much of the history involves a lot of politics, yet does not make as good reading as uncritical eulogies.

I think I am a little miffed

[Colin Leighfield]

I hope you're not Erfolg, you don't need to be. I'm familiar with Whittle's problems, they are well-aired. Pretty much most of what you say I don't disagree with. I think this book is definitive as far as it can be and I still trust Eric Brown's good judgement and commonsense. The predicted duration of the plane is described as 40 minutes, with a very rapid climb to altitude and time for 10 minutes supersonic. My position remains that we would have been better off if this had gone ahead.

I didn't mention politics in the last posting, (Tony did)? I'm not saying that I'm not interested in the politics, far from it, it is just that consistently they are disastrous, much as I would expect from the ultimate in failed professions.

[Erfolg]

Colin

I do not disagree that the M52 would have better to have gone ahead, we both certainly agree on that.

I also think that the Swallow project should have killed off, I say that with absolute certainty of hindsight.

Perhaps where we agree to disagree, is that most of the estimates of performance I have encountered were with hindsight most optimistic. That is at least initially, I do believe that RR would have made the device work eventually, even when initial problems might have been encounter. RR have had a history of excelling with development.

As for Eric Brown, what can be said, other than one of the most experienced and successfully test/development pilots of the era. I do put a lot store in his writings in the M52 book and his other books. At the same time I know that EB will have submitted the book for scrutiny by Government, under the Official Secrets act. I would not be surprised at all, that a lot has been deleted, and his comments amended to permit the publication.

Probably one major weakness of the M52 programme was that it was both a aerodynamic and engine development and research programme. Again with hindsight, sticking a Walter Rocket engine in, would have removed one problem.

You may even think I have a down on Miles. I can honestly say, that I admired so many of their designs. Yet again like DeHavilland, most of their experience was in wooden aircraft. Again with hindsight, without government contracts were doomed to Bankruptcy, as the civil market was to small for a company that did not shrink itself to the new world.

Given that the French were able to air launch a Leduc, i am positive the Uk could.

The M52 is yet another aircraft i would love to model, it has been one of my favourites, since I was made aware of the aircraft in my late teens, as another aircraft that got away.

As for the USA, well, who can blame them. Again in my teens I was shocked that the SR 177 was cancelled. Yet what appears to be a simple story, turns out far more convoluted and involved than at first sight. The Germans wanting, a development programme for German Industry, which could only be achieved by Government to Government dealings (the politics). The USA supporting the Lockheed sales drive, by various means, ranging from NATO protection funding and a little facilitating by Lockheed themselves (again more politics).

Yet the UK itself has been accused of facilitating our plane deals in the Middle East.

It is what governments do, within a ever changing set of loose rules and conventions. Ordinary people such as myself are often shocked, yet it is the same as it ever was, nothing really changes.

Edited By Erfolg on 20/07/2015 21:07:44

[Erfolg]

Having read Interceptor and being most impressed with the book, with respect understanding the link between engine power and firepower and then the implications stemming from this. Which brought in the M52 essentially in passing.

Our discussion was the catalyst to re-read EB's book with respect to the M52, as well as reading around the subject (again in some areas).

It is hard with hindsight that FW could have believed that the whole of the UK jet industry, which even then comprised RR, DeHavilland, Rover, MV, Arnstrong Siddley could or should be nationalised. There does seem to be a division in opinion, those who believe that his idea was accepted to his face, and then betrayal by nationalising PJ. To those who believe that the Ministry of Supply saw PJ as becoming a block, to the industry, making a loss ansd willingly accpeted the plan as far as PJ was concerned.

Perhaps what alos may interst is that the shape of the the M52 is less unique than suggested, perhaps being self evident taking the Leduc 0.10 of 1939 through to to the 0.22

I have seen these aircraft in the Paris air museum, they are pretty tiny.

Then their is the issue of the unique engine. I reality a development of the motor driven concepts of the Italians and French, by making the next step by use of the Jet engine to improve the ram aspect. I am wondering could this be one of the patents that added value to PJ. As the original patent of FW had expired by non renewal before WW2, which appears to be for the double compressor, rather than the concept of a jet engine. The Leduc 0.22 was conceptually very similar to the M52, although it could not get through the sound barrier, it is claimed due to lack of area ruling and power available.

It is also interesting that the M52 was initiated in October 1943. and the the D558-1 in June 45 the contract was placed using a TG-180 prototype rated at 3,820, actual supplied rated at 5,000 lb, not the service rating. I have seen (one of) this aircraft at the US Navy Pensecola Museum. Which first flew on the 15 May 1947. Went supersonic on the 29 September 1947, in a 35 degree dive, Flown by Gene May

When you consider that the contract was cancelled for the M52 on the 18 Feb 1946, you can see there was more than one show in town with respect to the X1 and M52.

Now you are probably thinking that I do not think that the M52 could have gone supersonic or was wort while. In reality I do believe that it could, but it would not have been easy and would have been an invaluable project. We can see just with a few examples that using very similar technologies and some similar ideas, that it was not easy at all. I do believe it would have taken a lot of money to see a decent programme through. Would it have been worth it? In my opinion yes, with hindsight I can see that without breaking the sound barrier a lot of information with respect to aerodynamics and the forces in the transonic region could have been obtained. Then there was information with respect to material performance in structures. Plus engine design and performance. The list keeps on going.

The trouble with history, is that dependant on your position relative to events and with the advantage of hindsight it appears different. Taking for example of the M52 in isolation, rather than being a part of a bigger picture, the story lacks perspective, although there is never one perspective.

I am now onto the NA A-12, that is where this story is currently taking me.